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Japan's four decades of experience with judicial review under the postwar
Constitution are difficult to evaluate fully without some appreciation of the
institutional and theoretical context within which judicial review occurs.
Thus, while I have little to add to the papers presented on this theme, a brief
comment on judicial review and its setting in Japan may be helpful.
The 1947 Constitution is widely understood to have introduced the idea of
judicial review into Japanese judicial practice.' This view is accurate,
however, only in the very narrow sense of direct judicial review of legislative
and administrative actions by the regular courts. Although the 1889
Constitution of the Empire of Japan ("the Meiji Constitution") did not
expressly provide for judicial review, it also did not deny the regular judiciary
the power of judicial review. Hence, the logic of Marbury v. Madison 2 was as
applicable in prewar Japan as it was in the United States. Chief Justice John
Marshall reasoned in Marbury that the legal rules of a constitution overrode
those of a statute or regulation. Thus, American courts could not properly
enforce a statute or administrative measure that was in conflict with
constitutional provisions. In a similar way, the regular Japanese courts in the
prewar era could rule on the constitutionality of a statute, regulation, or
administrative measure as long as the issue was properly presented in a case
over which the courts had jurisdiction. Japan's prewar courts, however, were
constrained in their ability to exercise judicial review by two factors: first, an
administrative court system that had exclusive jurisdiction over any direct
challenge to the legality of an administrative action; and, second, Japan's style
of parliamentary supremacy that limited nearly all expressly protected
constitutional rights.
As to the latter, in chapter 11 on the Rights and Duties of Subjects, the
Meiji Constitution included an impressive catalogue of constitutional
guarantees. Few, however, were absolute. Nearly all were subject to the
condition that they could be defined or limited by statute (horitsu). For
example, as commonly translated in English, Article 29 provided: "Japanese
subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing,
publication, public meeting and association."-3 The phrase "within the limits
of law" was not as open-ended as it appears in English translation. The
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original Japanese, more literally translated, reads "within the limits of statutory
law." In other words, only the elected Diet could restrict these liberties; they
were inviolable against encroachment by means of administrative or other
regulation. In a 1936 decision, 4 for example, the Great Court of Cassation
(Daishin'in) dismissed a prosecution based on an administrative enforcement
order issued pursuant to the 1933 Foreign Exchange Control Law because the
administrative agency improperly expanded the statutory language
prohibiting exports of gold bullion to include preparation of exports. The
implicit basis for the decision was Article 9 of the Meiji Constitution, which
provided that no imperial order "shall in any way alter any existing statutory
law [horitsu]. ' 5 Although inhibited by structural constraints, the regular
judiciary regularly reviewed administrative measures within the interstices of
the civil and criminal cases it adjudicated. 6
Moreover, in ordinary civil cases, prewar Japanese courts had, at least in
theory, as extensive remedial powers against the political organs of the state
as most common law courts had at that time. Judicial independence was
guaranteed by Article 57 of the Meiji Constitution, which stated that the
courts of law exercised their judicial powers "in the name of the emperor."
This phrase, like the military's claims in the 1920s and 1930s to direct access
to the throne as a prerogative of the emperor's supreme command, 7 was
prewar Japan's constitutional guarantee of judicial autonomy. The unique
historical nature of the imperial institution in Japan and the Meiji
Constitution's express definition of the emperor as the locus of all sovereign
authority combined to designate those institutions that acted in the name of
the throne, or with "direct access" to it, as theoretically insulated from legal
or political controls by other organs of government.
In addition to the historical and constitutional guarantees of judicial
independence, common law notions of the state's sovereign immunity did not
exist. As in other civil law systems, to the extent that the state's activities
could be construed as outside the scope of its governmental functions-such
as operation of a school playground or any commercial activity-they were
governed by private law and did not enjoy any immunity from ordinary claims
arising from tort or contract. As a result, the tort action, usually having the
beneficial remedy of damages, quickly became the most common means of
redress against improper official conduct.8
The postwar Constitution expanded these existing means of redress in two
ways. First, it abolished the administrative court system9 and expressly
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provided for judicial review.' 0  For most Japanese seeking redress from
illegal or otherwise improper governmental actions, however, the more
important provision is Article 17, which, literally translated, provides: "Every
person may sue for compensation from the state or a public entity, as
provided by law, in the event he has suffered damage by the delict of any
public official." This provision, which was added to the Constitution in the
Diet after receiving initially negative reactions from Occupation authorities,' 2
was the basis for a major expansion of state liability under the National
Compensation Law.' 3 As Michael Young and others have observed,' 4 the
remedy in tort, not the direct appeal, is the most popular vehicle for judicial
review under the postwar Constitution.
Neither the Constitution nor subsequent legal reforms dismantled the
theoretical scaffolding that supported the administrative court system and
other structured constraints on direct review. Doctrines that restrict standing
to sue and narrow the definition of reviewable administrative actions remain
in force along with constrained conceptions of judicial power and available
judicial remedies. The consequence is a judiciary without the capacity either
to exercise power of review or to provide forms of relief that most American
jurists take for granted. The malapportionment cases illustrate the more
general obstacle to judicial relief that exists in Japan relative to other
industrial democracies.
These limitations have not, however, reduced the courts to impotence. As
I have argued elsewhere,' 5 judicial review has become a crucial factor in
achieving political solutions through the democratic process. As the papers
presented on judicial review for this symposium indicate, under the postwar
Constitution, the Japanese judiciary has become a vital organ in Japanese
governance.
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